

SECRET

356

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations/DD/P

25X1

SUBJECT : State vs. CIA Responsibility for Political Reporting []

REFERENCE : Memorandum from [] Subject as above, dated 1 August 1958

25X

1. It is probable that the press and public will always consider the DCI and CIA primarily responsible for any intelligence "failures" because he and the Agency hold the dominant position in the intelligence field.

2. With respect to Congress and other Government departments who have at least some knowledge of the Director's "legal" responsibilities, they will certainly consider him as the one who can best explain the reason for any such "failures" and the one who can take appropriate action to correct any deficiencies.

3. The new NSCIDs do give the Director more specific authority and responsibility for the whole foreign intelligence effort. The more pertinent provisions are as follows:

NSCID 1, Par. 1: The DCI shall coordinate the foreign intelligence effort of the U. S.

NSCID 1, Par. 5: The DCI produces national intelligence required for the formulation of national policy.

NSCID 1, Par. 10: The DCI prepares, in consultation with the IAC, an appropriate national intelligence estimate of an impending crisis situation when the available raw information indicates the possibility of such a situation.

NSCID 1, Par. 14: The DCI, in coordination with the IAC agencies ensures that the pertinence, extent and quality of available foreign intelligence and intelligence information relating to the national security is continually reviewed as a basis for improving the quality of intelligence and the correction of deficiencies.

NSCID 2, Par. 1: The DCI, in consultation with the IAC, shall ensure that planning for the utilization of the collecting and reporting capabilities for intelligence purposes of each of the several departments and agencies provides adequate coverage for national security purposes.

SECRET

4. From the above, it is clear that the DCI does have the authority and responsibility to not only coordinate but to survey the adequacy of the collection effort conducted by the State Department or any other member of the intelligence community.

25X1

5. The memorandum from [] is primarily concerned with what he describes as "unexpected political events." It is believed that intelligence professionals or even laymen would consider that the U. S. clandestine effort is our primary insurance against being caught short by such "unexpected events."

6. It is not reasonable to expect that our overt collection effort, particularly that conducted by embassy personnel, is likely to obtain advance warning of a coup against the government in power to which our diplomatic family is accredited. The conspirators are not likely to confide in Americans whose official contacts are with the government they are trying to overthrow. With respect to forecasting an impending coup or similar event through the process of developing an intelligence estimate, it is clear that the DCI has this job. NSCID 1, paragraph 10 describes an impending crisis situation as any outbreak of hostilities or other condition which affects the security of the U. S. to such an extent that immediate action or decision by the President or the NSC may be required. And it is the DCI who must prepare an appropriate national intelligence estimate of such a situation.

7. For many years CIA has been striving to pin down, in positive terms, the Director's coordinating authority and the Agency's primary responsibility for clandestine activities. Both of these objectives have now been accomplished by the provisions of NSCID 1 and NSCID 5. However, as the established leader in the intelligence field, we are going to be the prime target for any rocks thrown as a result of any real or fancied intelligence "failures."

8. For these reasons, it would seem that the Agency has ample authority for engaging in any covert operations necessary. No DCID delimiting responsibilities would appear to be either necessary or desirable.

L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Director (Coordination)

RST/JSB
at address of basic